We use the structure of media markets within states and across state boundaries to study the relationship between television and electoral competition. Specifically, we compare incumbent vote margins in media markets where the content originates in the same state as the media consumers versus those where the content originates out-of-state. This contrast provides a clear test of whether television coverage correlates with the incumbency advantage. We study Senate and Gubernatorial races from the 1950s through the 1990s. We find that the effect of TV is small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant.
Introduction
The incumbency advantage is one of the most well-documented features of elections in the United States today. A large body of research has established that the incumbency advantage grew from roughly 1 or 2 percentage points in the 1940s to 8 to 10 percentage points in the 1990s.
1 The causes of the incumbency advantage and reasons for its dramatic growth, however, remain a puzzle.
The search for the origins of the incumbency advantage have gradually turned from the specific to the general. The incumbency advantage was first noted in U. S. House elections in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and it has driven much of the subsequent scholarship on federal and state legislative elections. In addition, it has been found that incumbents in nearly every state and federal office hold roughly similar electoral advantages, and the incumbency effect grew at roughly the same rate and at approximately the same time for all offices.
2 The search for the cause of legislators' incumbency advantages, then, has become a search for a general cause of incumbency advantages. There are a wide variety of plausible hypotheses, including the decline of party, interest group politics and campaign practices, and the growth of government.
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One important possible explanation is rise of television. Erickson (1995) , drawing on the literature on US House and Senate elections, has laid out the logic elegantly:
"the entrenching of incumbency seems to have coincided with the rise of television. Media scholar Robert Lichter (Lichter et al., 1986: 7) marks 1958 as the year 'the age of television began,' when the number of televisions approximately equaled the number of American homes. Perhaps not coincidentally, 1958 is also the precise year that the power of incumbency took off, according to Alford and Brady's analysis. By 1960... television was clearly having a powerful political effect. And if television is the engine to reelection, money is the fuel. With a full-time fundraising staff, incumbents have long had an advantage when it comes to building campaign war chests (Jacobson 1980 , Malbin 1984 . Television both decreased the unit cost of reaching voters, and provided the political process with
1 The literature is massive. A sampling of different estimation techniques and results is found in Erikson (1971) , Alford and Brady (1989) , Gelman and King (1990) , Levitt and Wolfram (1997) , and Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) .
2 For a comparison of many offices see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) . 3 On the decline of party see Cover (1977) ; on campaign contributions and interest group activities see Jacobson (1980) ; on the rise of government see Fiorina (1980) . a medium that was revolutionary in terms of its capacity to create public images. It maximized the impact of campaign funds by making possible, like never before, a personal appeal to voters."
Survey research provides further evidence of a possible link between television and the incumbency advantage. In general, incumbents receive more media coverage than their opponents (Robinson, 1981; Clarke and Evans, 1983; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Graber, 1989; Kahn, 1991) . Survey respondents who recognize a candidate are more likely to vote for that candidate (Jacobson, 1987) , and respondents who have higher levels of overall media use (the questions are not specific to television) are more likely to vote for incumbents (Goidel and Shields, 1994) . In addition, campaign managers evidently believe that television is the single most important communication medium (Hernsson, 1995) , and incumbents typically spend much more on television than challengers.
A series of studies, beginning with Campbell, et al. (1984) , seek to establish a direct link between television and electoral competition. The general approach is to measure the extent to which the structure of media markets effects election results and voting behavior.
One set of studies constructs a measure of media market "congruence" or "fragmentation" in congressional districts or states. Campbell, et al. (1984) , Niemi, et al. (1986) , and Levy and Squire (2000) find that congressional challengers fair better in districts that more closely match media market boundaries (congruence). Reynolds and Stewart (1990) find that in states with many different television markets (fragmentation) incumbents garner a greater share of the vote. In both cases, the inference is that an ease in communicating via television reduces the incumbency advantage. Prior (2002) introduces another measure of television in congressional districts -the number of television stations. He examines whether the number of televisions stations reaching a congressional district predicted the vote choice of respondents in to the National Election Survey from 1958 to 1970. He finds a significant relationship between the number of television stations and identification with the incumbent party, but insignificant direct effects of the number of television stations on intention to vote for the incumbent. He argues that there is an indirect effect of television on incumbency, operating through party identifications, and estimates that effect to be in the neighborhood of 1 to 2 percent of the total vote.
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We propose an alternative way to measure the effect of television on electoral competition.
We compare the incumbent vote margins in statewide elections in two different types of media markets -in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets. An in-state media market is a media market centered within a given state. The Milwaukee media market is an in-state media market for Wisconsin. An out-of-state media market is a media market centered in a city outside of a given state but which covers some part of a neighboring state.
The Minneapolis media market is the primary media outlet for the counties of southwestern Wisconsin. News in the Minneapolis media market focuses on Minnesota state politics and elections, not Wisconsin politics and elections. As a result, voters in southwestern Wisconsin receive much less television coverage of their state's politics than voters covered by in-state media markets such as Milwaukee.
Contrasting counties in in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets provides a better measure of the effects of television on the incumbency advantage for two reasons.
First, the measure is more clearly a function of actual television coverage than other measures of media market structure, such as fragmentation or number of television stations. As noted below, television coverage of a state's governor and other statewide officers is many times larger in in-state media markets than in out-state media markets. There is no evidence that fragmentation, congruence, and number of television stations correlate strongly with television coverage or advertising.
5 Second, we can hold constant the candidates running, 4 He specifies a hierarchical system of equations in which television predicts incumbent party identifications and then identifications plus television predict vote choice. One must include party identifications in the second equation to avoid omitted variable bias. There is the possibility that the system is truly simultaneous, in which case an instrumental variable estimator is required. The equation predicting vote choice as a function of number of television stations, identification with the incumbent party, and other factors yields a coefficient on number of television stations of approximately .02 with a standard error of .03; the coefficient on party identification is large and highly significant.
5 Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) measure the costs of television advertising directly using data on actual advertising rates, district by district, and find only a small correlation between congruence, fragmentation, and cost. Also, it is not clear that the number of television stations is a good proxy for media coverage. Indeed, expectations might run counter to the estimated effects. For example, suppose that television covers prominent personalities. In a district with one television station and one House member, the House member might receive a lot of coverage, as he is relatively prominent person. But, in a city with many House members and many television stations, House members may receive little or no television the closeness of the election, and other features of the race. The same two candidates are running in all counties within a state. Voters in in-state media markets and in out-state media markets face the same electoral choices. This is an advantage over previous studies since they typically do not control for key variables such as candidate quality or type of district. Such controls are automatic in our study.
Our basic finding can be summarized as follows: We find no evidence that the incumbency advantage is systematically higher (or lower) in counties with in-state media markets than in counties with out-of-state media markets. Therefore, we doubt that television is responsible for the rise of the incumbency advantage.
Methodology

Study Design and Evidence
Media markets definitions are based on viewing patterns and do not respect state boundaries. A given media market may be concentrated in a city in one state and cover rural and suburban counties of a neighboring state. Examples include the Minneapolis-St. Paul Media Market which includes western Wisconsin, Chicago, which includes parts of Indiana, Denver which includes western Nebraska, Providence, RI, which includes Massachusetts, Pittsburgh which includes the panhandle of Maryland, and Atlanta which includes northeastern Alabama. coverage (the mayor is likely to be much more prominent than any individual House member).
6 The two most widely used are Designated Market Areas (DMA's), constructed by Nielson, and Areas of Dominance Influence (ADI's), constructed by Arbitron. According to Arbitron, "The Area of Dominance Influence [ADI] is a geographic market design that defines each television market exclusive of the others, based on measurable viewing patterns. Each market's ADI consists of all counties in which the home market stations receive a preponderance of viewing, and every county in the continental U.S. is allocated exclusively to one ADI" (Broadcasting-Cable Yearbook, 1990 People who live in counties that are in out-of-state media markets will see very little, if any, coverage of the political races that affect them (Stewart and Reynolds, 1990) . Second, political campaigns for statewide office face a similar resource allocation problem. They too have limited resources, and it is very expensive on a per voter basis to advertise in an out-state media market.
Although this assumption is frequently made in other studies of media markets, we are the first to document the differences in free and paid media between in-state and out-of-state media markets.
News Media Coverage of Incumbents
We conducted a comprehensive analysis of news coverage of governors on 90 stations in 51 media markets. For each media market, we searched the on-line archives of the three network affiliated stations for stories that mention the governors of states covered by that media market.
11 Table 1 gives the overall number of stories about states' governors. The table presents the results for all 51 markets, as well as examples from the ten most populous media markets of the 51 we surveyed. Overall, we found that news programs aired 10 times as many stories about the in-state governor than they did of governors from neighboring states covered by the media market. The number of stories about the out-of-state governors was typically extremely small, and on the order of noise. We analyzed the number of ads and advertising expenditures by candidates in in-state vs.
out-of-state media markets. The results are presented in Table 2 . As with news coverage, outof-state media markets suffer from a paucity of political coverage from campaign advertising.
There are 20 times fewer ads in out-of-state markets, and candidates spend 40 times less in these markets.
NES Data
Further support for our research design comes from the National Election Studies. The 1978 data set contains more detailed questions regarding contacts with Senate candidates. Once again, we find that respondents living in counties with out-of-state media markets are 20 percentage points less likely to report seeing a Senate candidate on television compared to those living in in-state media markets (90% to 70%, respectively). Respondents reported the same level of contact with Senate candidates via mail and radio in both types of counties.
14 Free and paid media are the primary reasons that television, as a medium, is thought to generally benefit incumbents. Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar (1993), Prior (2002) , Erickson (1995) , and others assert that the rise of television contributes to the incumbency advantage through exactly these two mechanisms. If this effect is real and large enough to explain a noticeable share of the incumbency advantage, then incumbents should enjoy higher vote margins in in-state media markets than they do in out-of-state media markets.
Statistical Model and Data Processing
To measure the effect of television on electoral behavior, we contrast the difference in incumbent vote margins in counties that are covered by in-state media and counties that are covered by out-of-state media. We study Gubernatorial and Senatorial races. These are the most prominent offices in a given state and have, by far, the largest amount of media attention. Also, these two offices encompass the entire state and determining which markets are inside the jurisdiction is straightforward -unlike some House districts. Although most of the literature on this topic concerns House elections, the rise in the incumbency advantage in Senatorial and Gubernatorial election parallels the House quite closely (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002).
14 There is some evidence of substitution at work. Respondents in counties with out-of-state media markets were 30% more likely to report that they had contact with a Senate candidate or one of their staffers, or attended a rally with a senate candidate, than respondents in counties with in-state media markets. These results suggest that candidates severely curtail television advertising in those counties that are in out-of-state media markets but sometimes attempt to counter this deficit by focusing on those counties in other ways.
We use a statistical model of the incumbency effect developed by Levitt and Wolfram (1997) . Let i index offices, let j index counties, and let t index years. Let V ijt be the share of the two-party vote received by the Democratic candidate running for office i in county j contained in state k in year t. Let I ikt = 1 if the Democratic candidate running for office i in state k in year t is an incumbent, let I ikt = −1 if the Republican candidate running for office i in state k in year t is an incumbent, and let I ikt = 0 if the contest for office i in state k in year t is an open-seat race. Then:
if j is in an in-state media market
if j is in an out-of state media market. We then compare the coefficients β in and β out . We allow all coefficients to vary by decade.
To capture the partisan division of counties and national partisan tides, the model includes separate year and county fixed-effects. The county fixed-effects capture the underlying partisanship (normal vote) in each county, and the year fixed-effects capture national tides.
A potentially serious objection to this model is that partisanship moves in different directions in different counties across different years. This, and other objections, can be addressed using slight variations on the specification. The results obtained using various alternative specifications are presented in the Appendix (Table A. 3). They are not significantly different than the results reported in the body of the paper.
Estimating equations (1) and (2) by ordinary least-squares gives equal weight to each county, no matter how small or large the county is. However, we are mainly interested in the behavior of voters, not counties. We therefore estimated equation (1) and (2) via weighted least squares, weighting by population. It is of course impossible to eliminate aggregation bias simply via weighting, and some readers will prefer to see OLS estimates, so we present unweighted results of all specifications in the Appendix (Tables A.5-A.7). Table 3 presents the definitions and filters we used in analyzing the data. Further information on these filters, as well as information on the sources of the data, can be found in Appendix B. Table 4 gives summary statistics on the data itself.
Results
Our basic results are summarized in Table 5 . The most important figures are the differences between the level of the incumbency advantage in the two types of counties. If this difference is negative, it means that the data indicate television lowered the incumbency advantage. If it is positive, then television has increased the incumbency advantage.
The first column pools all the data, while the second and third columns focus on midterm and presidential years, respectively. We analyzed these separately because the media situations might be quite different in those years. For example, the high intensity and vast coverage of the presidential campaign might "crowd out" other campaigns.
The results tell a simple story. For the most part the difference in incumbency advantage between the two types of counties is small and statistically insignificant. The difference also does not seem to be increasing, so it is unlikely that the rise in incumbency advantage is due to television. Finally, the difference is generally less than 25% of the total incumbency advantage. In no cases were we able to reject the hypothesis that the incumbency advantage in the two different kinds of counties was different, even at the 0.1 level. Looking at the presidential and midterm years, we find that in only one case would we reject the null hypothesis at the 0.01 level -elections in non-presidential years between 1986-1995. And in this case the estimates indicate that television had a negative effect on the incumbency advantage.
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A natural experiment, like this one, may have flaws that bias the results. The following sections deal with the most likely sources of bias. We emphasize that all of the analyses that follow support the results displayed in Table 5 .
The Rise of Cable Television
Local cable television stations in an "out-of-state" market might cover in-state politics.
Based on the information below, we believe that cable television is irrelevant to our study frame, and cable news does not alter the general method developed here.
Cable television had virtually no market in any county before the mid-1980s, which is the end of our study frame. Cable penetration had only reached 20% by 1980. By 1995 that number had risen to 65% of homes with televisions, but cable accounted for only 46% of total viewing hours (Eisenmann, 2000) . Furthermore, the results we observed in the first three decades of our study, when the impact of cable were negligible, do not differ significantly from the last decade. If cable television had an impact on the incumbency advantage then we would expect to see a different pattern in the first three decades of our study as opposed to the fourth. No such pattern is supported by the data.
Furthermore, cable news programming didn't exist until the mid 1980s and was not an important medium until the mid-1990s (Thalhimer et. al., 2004) . Ultimately, this paper is about whether television viewing and news coverage might explain the emergence of the incumbency advantage in the 1950s and 1960s and its expansion through the mid-1980s.
Cable comes on the scene long after the incumbency advantage.
Finally, the general method of comparison incorporates cable viewing in three ways. Counties in out-of-state media markets are much smaller and less urban, and a bit poorer than those in in-state media markets. These differences are not of particular concern since at disaggregated levels these characteristics have not been found to be linked to the size of the incumbency advantage. However, at a state level population has been linked to the size of the incumbency advantage (e.g., Hibbing and Brandes, 1983) . Differences in partisanship -a factor that is clearly linked to they incumbency advantage -are small and generally insignificant. Details of these differences can be found in Appendix A (Table A .1).
In order to assuage concerns that these differences might bias our results, we matched the counties with out-of-state media markets to counties with in-state media markets on the four dimensions below and estimated the size of the incumbency advantage using only the matched counties. The results are summarized in the Appendix A (Table A. 2). They are not significantly different from our results without using matching. The results presented in the rest of this paper do not employ matching in order to capitalize on the statistical power of a larger data set.
Closeness of Race
Another possible source of bias is that media exposure, both paid and free, varies widely across different elections based on the closeness of the race, and the strategies employed by the candidates. For most years we do not know how much candidates spent on media since candidate's expenditure reports are at such widely varying levels of granularity. Some of them itemize each expenditure, while others report only a single amount spent with a consulting group that takes care of both the production of ads and the buying of air-time (Stewart and Reynolds, 1990 ).
For 1970 and 1972, however, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collected data on how much each senate and gubernatorial candidate spent on television advertising.
We used this data to divide our sample into terciles based on the amount of money per capita spent on television in that race. Media spending is an accurate proxy for the media exposure of a campaign. If our design covered up a difference in media effects by not incorporating the relative media intensities of campaigns, it should show up in this analysis.
The results are summarized in Table 6 . The difference in incumbency advantage between the two types of counties varies quite a bit across the three terciles, but there is no discernible pattern. The tercile with the highest media spending, and thus, media intensity, does not have a larger (or positive) difference than the other terciles. The exact results are somewhat sensitive to the thresholds used to define "High" vs. "Low" spending. In no case, however, do the estimates exhibit a consistently and significantly higher incumbency advantage in the counties dominated by in-state television. This indicates that the basic findings reported in Table 5 are not masking the effects of varying media intensity.
A similar analysis can be done by dividing all of the data in our data set into quartiles based on the closeness of the race. We could do this by using the observed ex-post closeness of the race, but this raises endogeneity concerns as we would be dividing the data set by the dependent variable of our regression. Instead, we use as a proxy for media intensity the pre-election predictions reported in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports (CQ).
Each election year, CQ makes predictions about how close a race is going to be and who they believe will win the election. They always predict congressional, and occasionally gubernatorial, races. For the years 1956-1976 they used what is effectively a three point scale to judge race closeness. This ranged from the closest (Doubtful, or No Clear Favorite depending on year) to the least competitive (Safe Democratic or Safe Republican). The CQ predictions take media intensity into effect, as the comments that go along with each race often point to high media intensity or well funded competitors in justifying the call. More details of this data can be found in Appendix B. Table 7 presents the results of using these predictions to separate races of varying degrees of competitiveness. 16 The tightly contested races -those that in general will have a higher media intensity than less contested races -show no discernible increase in the incumbency 16 The number of observations is different than that in previous tables because CQ usually does not make predictions about gubernatorial races.
advantage due to television. If anything, they show a slight, and statistically insignificant, decrease in the incumbency advantage due to television.
Finally, as noted above, we present unweighted (OLS) versions of Tables 5-7 in Appendix
A (Tables A.4 -A.6, respectively). The results are generally similar to the weighted results, and the overall conclusion to draw from them is the same.
Conclusion
Our results strongly suggest that the rise of the incumbency advantage had little to do with television. We find that television has a small, directionally indeterminate, and statistically insignificant effect on the incumbency advantage. Since the growth of the incumbency advantage in the US Senate and Governorships parallels that in the US House, the state legislatures, and executive offices we believe that our results are indicative of those that would be found with these other offices.
The methodology developed in this paper can be readily extended to other settings. Specifically, it is possible to conduct a similar analysis for U.S. House districts. That analysis is not performed here as some adjustments would be needed in order to account for the small number of house districts with both in and out of state media. One might also use this approach to measure the effects of media coverage on other sorts of political outcomes, such as turnout or, using survey data, individuals' attitudes and perceptions of competition.
It is also important to point out what we have not shown.
We have not shown that campaigns have no effect on the incumbency advantage -only that television, as a campaign medium, is no more effective at conveying an incumbency advantage than any other type of campaigning. Our findings are consistent with those in Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002) , who find that when congressional candidates face high costs of television advertising they substitute strongly into other forms of communication, such as direct mail.
Our finding only applies to the effect of television campaign ads and television news coverage of specific electoral contests, not the broader effect of television on American culture or politics. Specifically, we have compared counties that received campaign ads and news coverage of elections with those that did not. We did not compare counties where there were no televisions to counties with televisions (indeed, we could not, as television was in nearly every county by the late 1950s).
Another argument holds that television changed politics itself. The "insider" orientation of television news may stimulate people to think more highly of incumbents or to think that incumbency matters a lot and they should vote for incumbents whenever they see them.
Television coverage of politics and campaigns might produce a general, pro-incumbent message -more pro-incumbent than other media -helping incumbents running in all offices.
Television might also cause other news media to change their messages in a pro-incumbent direction. We cannot rule out the hypothesis that television caused the incumbency advantage by promoting incumbents in general across the country, because our comparison is based on within state comparisons.
This cultural argument, however, is different than the standard arguments. The usual arguments -and the claims made in the existing empirical literature -involve biased coverage and unequal resources for television advertising, which varies race by race. The arguments are of the form: "Individual incumbents receive more television coverage than their opponents, and/or they receive more favorable coverage, and/or they spend more on television advertising, affecting the voting behavior of voters in that race." The arguments are not of the form: "television coverage is generally pro-incumbent, so all voters think more highly of all incumbents and vote for them a bit more than they would have otherwise (even though they have not seen specific messages from or about most of these incumbents)."
Demonstrating that such a shift has occurred requires a much broader comparisonacross countries. But, when one looks abroad, there is an obvious problem with the hypothesis that television is a key driver of the incumbency advantage in the United States.
Television is ubiquitous in advanced industrial democracies, but few countries have incumbency advantages estimated to be more than one or two percentage points. Even those with similar electoral systems, such as Britain and Canada, have trivial incumbency advantages.
It is easy to suspect television as the culprit behind the large shift in American electoral politics that occurred in the 1950s and 1990s. But the evidence of an actual connection is slight. The search for the cause of the incumbency advantage in the United States, then, should focus on other changes in our institutions, culture, or politics.
Appendix A: Detailed Statistical Treatment
This appendix addresses three statistical issues raised in the text. First, as mentioned in Section 3, there are significant differences between counties with in-state media markets and those with out-of-state media markets. We corrected for this difference by matching counties along each of the four dimensions summarized in Table A.1. We matched each out-ofstate county with the in-state county that had the most similar demographic characteristics.
Thus, the averages for the counties in in-state and out-of-state markets along each dimension became statistically indistinguishable. The results are summarized below in Table A .2. As reported above, controlling for these factors had no real effect on our main result -the difference in incumbency advantage due to television is small and statistically insignificant.
Second, as mentioned in Section 2, our method exploits the panel-data structure of two features of American elections. These features are (1) The United States holds many elections for any one type of office at one time, and (2) these elections occur at regular intervals. The results in the body of the paper do not exploit a third feature of American elections: the fact that the United States holds many elections within a given state or county at the same time.
Since we examine both Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections we can exploit this feature to some extent; however, since we examine only these two types of elections our ability to exploit this feature is limited.
Exploiting these features allows us to avoid statistical problems associated with estimating a normal vote. We take this normal vote into account by using year fixed effects to exploit the first feature above, and county fixed effects to exploit the second feature above.
If we were able to exploit the third feature above, we would be able to use a combined county-year fixed effect. However, we believe that estimating county and year fixed effects separately is also valid, since the normal vote varies much across counties in a given year than it does over time in a given county.
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The three formulas below correspond to the three columns of Table A.3. Let i index offices, j index counties, and t index years. Let V ijt be the share of the two-party vote 17 For more details, see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) .
received by the Democratic candidate running for office i in county j contained in state k in year t. Let I ikt = 1 if the Democratic candidate running for office i in state k in year t is an incumbent, let I ikt = −1 if the Republican candidate running for office i in state k in year t is an incumbent, and let I ikt = 0 if the contest for office i in state k in year t is an open-seat race. Additionally let year t be in decade d. Then:
As in the body of the paper, we estimate each equation separately for counties in in-state and out-of-state dominated media markets. We also allow the parameters to vary each decade.
Finally, the last two tables in the appendix are the unweighted (OLS) versions of Tables   5 -7 in the main body of the paper. These tables use year and county fixed effects, as do all the tables in the main body of the paper. We number these tables A.4 -A.6.
Appendix B: Data
County-level election returns are from ICPSR study number 13 (General Election Data for the United States, 1950 States, -1990 , and America Votes (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000) .
Incumbency status is from a variety of sources (see Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002 , for details).
Media market definitions are from Broadcast and Cable (1970 , 1980 , 2000 . We were unable to procure data on media market boundaries for the 1950s. However, media market boundaries have changed very little over the period that we did have data for, so we used media market information from the late 60s for the beginning part of our study. The most likely change to the media market structure would have been that the less populous areas had no established media markets. This would only be an issue for the years 1956-1960 in our study, since 90% of families owned television sets by 1960. Removing the least populous media markets for the early years of our study did not significantly effect our results. The effect of television on the incumbency advantage was still small (0.32%), and statistically insignificant.
We defined the dominant state of a media market to be the state that had at least 2 3 of the population of that media market. Likewise, we defined a county to be in a media market that was out-of-state dominated if the state the county was in had less than 1 3 of the population of the media market. We drop all counties that did not fall into one of these categories. We can include all counties by dropping the threshold for being classified as in-state dominated ) and in all cases found results similar to those reported in Table 5 .
Some markets are not centered in a single state. For example, a large fraction of the population of the St. Louis, Missouri, media market resides in Illinois. It is difficult to assert that the news directors in such markets will focus on just their own state. We omit such markets from the analysis in this paper -we focus only on media markets that are disproportionately in one state.
Occasionally a county may change from an in-state media market to one that is out-ofstate. Since we only collected media market at the beginning of each decade, this creates difficulty in classifying the county in the years in between. In order to avoid this difficulty, we dropped these counties from the analysis for the decade when their status was indeterminate.
Including these counties in the media market they were in at the beginning or end of the decade did not qualitatively change the results in Table 5 .
In some states, only a small percentage of the population lives in a media market that is dominated in-state. We dropped all counties in states where less than two-thirds of the population lived in in-state dominated media markets -we call these states "overwhelmed"
by out-of-state media. The reasoning is that politicians would not neglect TV advertising to such a large percentage of voters and hence would advertise in out-of-state media markets. There are some important notes on the data we collected from CQ. For 1960 -1964 what is effectively a five point scale, however, the names of the ratings put the two additional points between the three others generally used throughout this period. Including these inbetween calls in one or the other surrounding closeness categories did not significantly change the results. Additionally, 1972 used a two point scale and was excluded from this analysis.
Between 1978 and 1992, CQ switched to what is essentially a four point scale for race closeness. The scoring system used in 1994 is difficult to normalize across seats held by
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